JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. This statement was written by Walter Laqueur in 1969, in the conclusion to his book Europe since Hitler, published in 1970. Three years after it was written, the oil crisis occurred as a result of the Yom Kippur War, and articles prophesying the decline of Europe and its political and moral surrender to the Third World and its oil and petro-dollars again became an almost dominant intellectual fashion. The oil embargo and the huge financial reservoir which backed it up were seen as the revenge of the Third World against European colonialism and imperialism. What the Muslim army failed to achieve before Poitiers and where the Ottomans failed before the walls of Vienna, petro-dollars succeeded. The decadent West, hedonistic and materialistic, now lost all its vitality and had no choice but to crawl on its knees. The pessimistic consciousness of the fin-de-siecle, the Cassandra-like prophesies of the previous century and the metaphor of the 'decline of the West' expressed the mood of the mid-1970s. 
The first historical chapter began during the years of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars, which created the cornerstones of nineteenth-century Europe. Only in the eighteenth century, we must recall, did the idea of'Europe' reach its peak and become a widespread topos. The Jewish response was mainly one of heightened expectations; high hopes from the 'new Europe' of the inevitable progress which, in due course, would open the gates to a new and better world for the Jews. The French Revolution was not the main cause of this optimism, but rather the reformist trends in the 'Enlightenment monarchies' in Europe. The 'Tolerance Edict' of Josef II (1782) rather than the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen was regarded as a sign of the new horizons. The first signs of pessimism both in the 'East' and 'West', as a result of and in response to different events, were already discernible in the 1870s.2 The optimistic utopia of the Jewish Haskala had changed, within certain circles, into deep disappointment, which grew faster in the 1880s and thereafter. The response of the Jewish intelligentsia to the rise of modern anti-semitism thus became intertwined with the general mood of pessimism and was fed by it. They saw anti-semitism both as a major pathological symptom of the European essence and as a result of fin-de-siecle decadence. The different varieties of Jewish radicalism, including radical nationalism, were one of the sharp responses to this general Kulturpessimismus, and a manifestation of the conclusion which the Jewish intelligentsia drew from it. Eschatology of many types -revolutionary and national -was the reaction to the deep pessimism. It was an inevitable result of the eagerness to find redemption in the midst of a crisis. Therefore, it would be right to claim that the nationalism of the Jewish intelligentsia and semi-intelligentsia was not a product of great optimism, but a result of deep disappointment and frustration, which sought compensation and new horizons. So high was the expectation, and so deep were the disappointments, that an alternate utopic-eschatological world-view was needed in order to replace the decaying ones and to provide adequate answers to the crisis. The disappointment with emancipation blended with the new negative attitude towards 'Europe', in which Jewish intellectuals longed to be rooted.
The third historical chapter opened after the first world war. It was manifested by a combination of the general reaction to the great war and its upheavals, and the mood of the 'decline of the West', which was strengthened after the war, and was accompanied by the belief that new vital civilizations were going to take the place of Europe. The deep influences of this intellectual mood on European politics and culture are well known. To this general background one should add the Jewish reaction to the great and bloody pogroms against the Jews in the East during the war and after.3
The fourth historical chapter began with the rise of nazism and needless to say, became a main issue on the Jewish agenda and in the Jewish world-view after the Holocaust. The question which engaged Jewish understanding of history in general and Western history in particular was: had Europe exposed its real face, its real nature, or was it only a part of it, only one layer of its entire entity? Was nazism an inherent feature of the 'European essence' or was it a diverted characteristic, an 'historical accident'? Since the late 1940s, this crucial question has occupied Jewish philosophy and polemics and has become a central topic within the Jewish Zeitgeist. The question, and the different answers given to it, shaped the world-view of the Jews and their attitudes towards the past, present and future history of the Jewish people (and its active behaviour in history).
The fifth historical chapter began in the late 1980s. This article focuses on several manifestations from the second and third historical chapters -in other words, on the ambivalent reaction of modern Jewish nationalism to the pessimistic mood and formulations of thefin de siecle in Europe, and the conclusions it drew from this reaction. It is not the intention of this article to present the vast scope of these expressions and reactions. The main aim here is to present several characteristic responses, which serve as an illustration to the main argument.
The main argument is that while quite a large number of Jewish intellectuals and men of letters became nationalists in response to the pessimism of thefin de siecle and, by adapting its world-view, derived radical national and cultural conclusions from it, Zionism as an organized, active, historical phenomenon, acting on the stage of modern history, was able to gain power and strength, and to achieve international status and momentum, mainly due to the fact that the Europe of the late nineteenth century was not a declining continent, but rather a world at its apogee -a Europe which shaped the world outside itself in almost every sphere of human life. Those who expressed a negative attitude to Europe in general were far from rejecting the basic components of European civilization (or 'modernism').
Hence, we are faced with a sharp contradiction, even a deep gap, between historical consciousness and moods of reaction and expression, feelings and attitudes, as were formulated and internalized in the self-awareness of the Jewish intelligentsia, in its 'historical reality' as 'it really was' and its cultural behaviour. It was Max Nordau who, perhaps more than any other Jewish intellectual of that period, profiled and canalized the nature of the prevailing Kulturpessimismus that emphasized the existence of a gap between a world-view and objective reality. Nordau claimed that the 'mania of sadness', in his own terms, of the fashionable pessimism, represented the victory of the imaginative forces over reality.4 Such was also Auerbach's criticism of Hess, when he wrote that Jewish intelligentsia tends to interpret the world in accordance with its own personal biography. In fact, what he had meant to say was that the sensitive threshold of the intellectual drives him to enforce his own biography on 'history' at large and to interpret it according to his own despair and expectations.5 From the view-point of a provincial town (Tomshapol), Yehuda Leib Levin (Ya-a-llel) found that the consciousness of decadence was a mere fashionable sickness, by which the Jewish intelligentsia had been afflicted, under the influence of the Russian (and German) intelligentsia. In his view, it was an expression of a confusion of concepts and romantic daydreams, and the ardour with which Jews grab fashionable intellectual and literary ideas. It was a result of 'a panic which had been transferred into boredom'.6 He himself rejected the notion that Jews must sever their cultural links with Europe.
We should remember that a distinction must be made between the awareness of change and the more concrete descriptions of the society and culture in Europe at the crossroads of the nineteenth century. We must also be aware of the fact, already mentioned, that only during the eighteenth century did the concept of'Europe' as a geographically and culturally united entity take its place as a superstructure under which its divisions, differences and national diversity could exist.7 The topic here is 'Europe' as a unity and uniformity, but Jews were, of course, well aware of the fact that every European culture had its own nature, and therefore approached each of them separately. The variety which is Europe, wrote Ber Borchov before the first world war, is under the threat of the German spirit. 8 In the world-view of the maskilim, Europe was indeed the heart and centre of humanity. They adopted with excitement and expectation the idea of the 'white man's burden', and its Eurocentric outlook. Europe, wrote one Jewish newspaper in the middle of the century, willingly opens its heart and treasures for all humankind. It is ready to spread its wisdom and its many achievements in the far-off lands of India, China and Japan, being like dew to these far-away dry fields.'3 This was how a newspaper (which was published in the provincial town of Luck, on the border of Prussia and Russia) saw the 'new imperialism'.
Less than thirty years later, another Hebrew newspaper bitterly expressed its conclusion with regard to the deep crisis of Jewish optimism. Europe, the fortress of progress, had revealed itself as the bosom of the anti-semitic monster. This was the 'real' new Europe, the Europe that Jews worshipped, whose wisdom and education they praised, and in order to be accepted by whom they were ready to betray their most treasured national possessions.'4 Some of them found compensation in the theories which distinguished between the progress of civilization and the state of morality. There was no link, they claimed, between progress in the material sphere and the degenerate state of morality. The missing books (this letter was written in 1887) were of course only one aspect of Europe, a central aspect indeed, but not the only one. The departure from Europe and the settling in the 'desert of the East' was considered an existential necessity, and not always an act of free will and free choice, a fact that was a driving force behind the visions of a total renaissance of the Jewish existence in Palestine.
Uri Zvi Greenberg, the poet who was imbued with an apocalyptic, pessimistic outlook and who declared his hatred towards 'Europe', gave an illuminating example of this ambivalent attitude: ' by itself is evidence of this) .
Herzl, one of the outstanding 'westernized' Jewish intellectuals and leaders of the national movement, pointed very clearly to the central role of daily life as an integral part of'culture'. 'East' and 'West' were not only two different metaphors or two contradicting topoi, but were real and dynamic differing complexes of everyday life, of 'culture' as human environment. In a paragraph which, from a historical perspective may be regarded as naive and even pathetic, Herzl wrote that daily habits were portable and could be transplanted from one place to another. Not only ideas, laws and beliefs could be taken in one's travelling-bag, but also one's 'small habits'. The history of colonization movements, certainly in the modern age, provided solid and indisputable evidence of this, and explained why Herzl had no difficulty in portraying the establishment of a modern European Jewish society in Palestine. His Europe was not only the Europe of trains, theatres, parliaments, art galleries, electricity, etc., nor was it an 'organic Europe'. It was a Europe of daily life, containing the many things people were used to, all of which were included in the 'fleshpots' that Jews would not leave behind in Europe. In the Judenstaat, Herzl therefore stressed the fact that modern technology was used everywhere mainly in order to transplant these 'small habits' to the new homelands: there were English hotels in Egypt and on the top of the mountains in Switzerland, Viennese-style coffee-shops in Latin America, French theatre in Russia, German operas were performed in North America, and the best Bavarian beer was to be found in Paris! In leaving Egypt behind, he declared, we would not forget the 'fleshpots of Europe'. We would take them with us.29
By this Herzl intended not only to calm those who feared that leaving Europe would mean leaving behind for ever all that was so dear to the bourgeois Jew, whose main concerns were his daily comforts and conveniences. Certainly, he never saw himself as advocating 'cultural colonization', i.e. transplanting a certain 'culture' from its 'natural place' to a strange, alien environment and imposing it on a place (and its people) where it did not belong. His main aim was not only to gain the support of middle-class Jews, but to reject the common and widespread theory that there existed a deterministic linkage between a place and a culture, and that as a result of this linkage, the creation of a Jewish culture in Asia would not mean the creation of an 'Asiatic Jewish culture'. Cultures, Herzl voiced very clearly, were man's creations, and it was the human spirit and human initiative which gave a place its identity and character. It was culture that endowed a place with its uniqueness and not the other way round. Therefore, for the 'West', the 'East' was not a geographic border.
As is well known, Herzl was branded 'messianic' or 'utopian' and certainly as one who held 'European prejudices'. Eurocentric he was indeed, but at the same time he was far more realistic than many of his contemporary critics, for whom the question of modern Jewish Kultura was the main concern. For them, culture meant mainly ideas, values, an organic whole, spirit, etc., while for Herzl it was a dynamic complex of human existence and environment in its total scope and its many aspects. His concept of culture was not an idealistic and abstract one, like that of most of his critics. At the same time, his notion of modernity was also not of a poetic nature. He was very well acquainted with the nature of modern, urban-industrial society. Here indeed we face a paradox: a society which was created by, among other forces, the pessimistic response tofin-de-siecle Europe, and by a sharp critique of the values Europe represented, was, from the outset, a European society in essence and in framework. So strong was the Jewish bond with Europe that even the Holocaust was unable to sever it. There was no fleeing from Europe, and the different efforts to escape from it merely emphasize this deep link, and the impossibility of cutting off its roots and its heritage.35 
